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Abstract 
This paper provides an analysis of what information can be found on laptops that may or may not have 
connections to an organisation of some form, the statistics of the number of laptops stolen or otherwise 
misplaced in 2015 and 2016, and the number of potentially affected people from each of the cases. As seen in 
many news articles, laptops are often stolen or otherwise misplaced by employees or contractors in an 
organisational environment. As discovered in this research, many laptops are stolen from vehicles or homes of 
employees rather than organisation’s buildings, but not all. The majority of stolen or otherwise misplaced 
laptops have very little information security on them, and this increases the risk of a data breach once a third 
party has physical access to the device. The research finds that, with available information, only one laptop had 
used encryption for the personal, private and confidential information that was stored on the internal storage 
device. In total, this paper finds that 33 laptops were stolen or otherwise misplaced in 2015 and 2016. The 
healthcare industry had the largest number of potentially affected people, with 5,352,792 people, and an 
average of 334,350 across the 16 laptops. The government sector had the second highest impact, with a total of 
1,000,865 potentially affected people. Out of the 33 laptops, the total number of potentially affected people was 
6,598,995 affected people, with an average of 83,702 potentially affected people with each of the 33 laptops. 
Keywords: Laptop; Stolen; Misplaced; Data Breach; 2015; 2016 
BACKGROUND 
What information can be stored on laptops? 
A computer device can contain a large amount of information, which with the correct software and hardware 
tools can be forensically analysed to find information of interest. This information can include: 
 Temporary files: 
o Application data. 
o Web browser data. 
 Active directory (AD) user account on organisational devices with an active directory server. 
 Offline files from network drives, including drives configured with active directory. 
 Network configurations: 
o Wireless credentials. 
o IP address configurations. 
 User credentials 
o Organisational systems 
o Banking system 
o Social media 
o Session data 
 Intellectual property 
 Other personal information 
o Black mail potential 
Temporary files can include data that is stored on a local system by an application. For example, a database 
application may store information that was retrieved or worked on from a database in the temporary files on the 
system. By analysing this data, it is possible that personal and private information may be available on the 
system in the temporarily stored files from the database system. 
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Web browser data can include session data for emails, databases or other systems that require authentication. 
This information, which is stored in cookies, could allow an attacker to bypass the authentication on a system by 
restoring a previously open session before the server times out the session. Research finds that some versions of 
Firefox are known to store cookies and other session data in a SQLite database (Pereira, 2009), which can easily 
be recovered with the correct tools. 
An active directory (AD) system in an organisation copies a user’s account files to the system that is used to log 
onto the domain (Microsoft, 2016). This account data can include any private and confidential documents that a 
user may have stored in their personal account. By analysing this data, an attacker could potentially gain access 
to confidential information from an organisation and gain access to temporary internet files for internal web 
pages in the organisation. The attacker could then view these pages to find any vulnerabilities in the services, 
and view the data from the active directory user account to see if there is any confidential information stored by 
the user in their account or their temporary files folders. 
A computer device may be configured to store files offline from network drives or other shared folders 
(Microsoft, 2017a) in an organisation, either with or without an active directory server. This data can be analysed 
for confidential information that is stored on the organisation’s internal servers that has been copied to the 
laptop’s internal storage device. 
A computer device may also contain network configurations for corporate networks, which attackers could use 
to determine how to continue gaining further access to the information systems at their target organisation. This 
network information can include wireless credentials that can allow attackers to connect other devices to the 
organisation’s network and gain further access to information, as Windows allows users to view the wireless pre-
shared key in plain text (Microsoft, 2017c) when they have physical access to the device. 
Issues involved in the theft of laptops 
All the information described above shows how much information could potentially be stored on a single device. 
If these devices are stolen or otherwise misplaced, a third-party individual or group could have access to a large 
amount of information. This could potentially allow them to leak more information than that found on the stolen 
device, as they could use configuration data to gain further access to the information systems on personal or 
organizational networks and gain access to more data. 
With access to this device, the individual or group in possession of the device could leak any information they 
find on the device, and with the amount of information that could be stored on a single device, this has the 
potential to destroy the security reputation of an organization. 
Furthermore, an attacker could install malicious code to a device, then attempt to anonymously return the device 
to the organization to attempt to back-door their way into the organization. If a re-obtained device is not 
thoroughly examined for additional code or applications running on the device, it could cause potential leaks of 
more confidential information from the organization. 
Following the loss or integrity breach of this information and data, there are a number of potential outcomes, 
including: 
 Data loss 
o Data being deleted and no longer being accessible or useable to the user. 
 Data misuse 
o Data being used for purposes other than the intended use. 
 Fraud 
 Unlawful or unethical releases of private information 
 Black mail 
 Data damage 
o Data being either corrupted or encrypted making it inaccessible while it still exists on the 
storage device. 
 Reputation loss 
o Loss of data integrity reputation to the organisation or individual that was the subject of the 
data breach. 
 Commercial advantage to a third party engaging in information warfare 
o The potential for another organisation to possess the research and other intellectual property 
created and stored by the user of the laptop. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
The statistics for this paper were gathered by using an advanced search in Google News specifying news articles 
only, dated from 01/01/2015 to 31/12/2015 with the keywords “laptop data breach”. Google then returns news 
articles from laptops that were reported stolen or misplaced in 2015 with the potential information that may have 
been stored on them and how much data could have been breached. The search can also be limited to “Australia 
Only” to get news results for data breaches in Australia instead of worldwide. However, this does not yield 
enough results for this paper, and so this search limitation can be removed for further results. 
These same search queries were run, but the dates were changed to starting at 01/01/2016 and ending at 
31/12/2016 to obtain the statistics for laptops that were stolen or otherwise misplaced in 2016. 
Only news articles that specify that a data breach occurred due to a laptop being stolen or otherwise misplaced 
are in the scope of this paper, other forms of data breaches, including network attacks, are not in the scope of this 
paper and will be ignored in the search results of news reports or articles. 
To get the information to be compared, each article was examined, and the industry section, information about 
how many people are affected by the data breach, and if the device was secured and how will be entered into a 
table that will be used to compare the statistics from all newspaper articles found, with references. 
From this gathered information, comparisons and discussions can be made about: 
 The total number of data breaches from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in 2015. 
 The total number of data breaches from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in 2016. 
 The total number of people affected by the breaches in both 2015 and 2016. 
 The average number of people per breach. 
 The security in place on each of the stolen devices, and the security of the data on each of the devices. 
 The average security setup for the laptops. 
If any of the above information is unavailable, average calculations can be made for the total number of 
available statistics for each data type, or it will be assumed that zero people were affected by the unspecified 
breaches. 
For the general information in this paper, other papers and technology webpages will be reviewed and cited for 
their information regarding the potential data that can be stored on laptops, based on their possible 
configurations and uses within or external to an organization. 
DISCUSSION 
What information can be retrieved from a stolen laptop and how? 
When an attacker or another third party has physical access to a storage device from a laptop computer, they can 
easily gain access to the data that is stored on the disk. Utilizing many freely available forensic acquisition tools 
and utilizing the correct hardware, attackers or other unauthorized individuals or groups can view all of the data 
that is stored on the laptop in their possession, including data that has been deleted but the sectors have not yet 
been over-written. One method often used to retrieve this data is called file carving (Gladyshev & James, 2017). 
Active Directory and other locally stored files 
For example, if a laptop is connected to an Active Directory server, it will contain all of the information that the 
user has on any other system connected to that network. Assuming the device does not have encryption setup for 
the entire storage device, all of the information that has been downloaded from the Active Directory server will 
be visible in plain text. This can allow analyzers to easily scan for particular file types of interest or temporary 
database files. If an analyzer finds that files could have been deleted from the internal storage device on the 
laptop, with the correct hardware and software, the analyzer would be “able to recover the deleted files” 
(Hanson, 2005). 
A laptop may also contain offline files from a network drive at an organization. The type of data that would be 
stored here would depend on the information that is stored on the network drive in the organization. However, 
this data can range from personal information to freely available data such as application installers. 
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A laptop may also have credentials stored on it, such as wireless network credentials or usernames and 
passwords for internal or external websites and systems in the organization. Even if these are not stored in plain 
text, they can be dictionary or brute-force attacked by a powerful system or rainbow table to find the original 
passwords. This task can be easily performed on another system once the storage device from the stolen or 
misplaced laptop is obtained, and there are a number of open source, free to use tools that can achieve this 
(Eston, 2010). 
Web Browsers 
Modern web browsers store a large amount of temporary data on a system. If a laptop is acquired, there may be 
open session data stored in the browser’s temporary files and cookies, even if the user has attempted to delete 
them through their web browser (Pereira, 2009). This issue can allow an attacker to bypass the authentication 
systems on a web-based service and use the currently authenticated session on the device. With this session, an 
attacker could access more information stored on the network than just the information that was stored on the 
obtained device, and the attacker could potentially use this network access to launch more internal network 
attacks on the storage systems at the organization. 
Many users also choose to allow their web browsers to save their login information to many web pages and 
services. This information can be harvested in order to obtain and dictionary or brute force attack the credentials 
utilizing tools such as John The Ripper (Taiabul Haque, Wright, & Scielzo, 2014), to re-use them to obtain more 
information from the network. 
Web history data from web browsers can be used to determine what research was conducted on the laptop, or, 
what sites may have stored temporary information on the laptop. As temporary files are not often deleted, even if 
the user requests it (Pereira, 2009), there may be information of interest that can be obtained from recently 
viewed web pages that are in the browsing history of the device. Also, forensic tools can be used to view any 
temporary information that may have been deleted on the device. 
User Directory 
As discussed above, Active Directory servers will send a connected laptop a large amount of data or information 
from the storage systems from the network (Microsoft, 2016). However, if the system is not part of an Active 
Directory server, there may still be a large amount of information that is stored on the system while the user was 
working either on or off-site with data and information. 
While the device is either at an organization or connected to the network with a Virtual Private Network (VPN), 
any documents or other information/data that are accessed on the remote storage servers may be temporarily 
stored on the local storage device in the laptop. This data can be harvested for any temporary data that might 
contain confidential information. 
If an organization has a web-based document management system, such as Microsoft’s SharePoint, there may be 
temporary downloaded documents stored in the user directory folder on the laptop’s storage device. These files 
may contain completed forms or other records potentially containing confidential data or information. 
Temporary internet files that are stored on the system from accessing the websites on the internal networks could 
be analyzed to find and potentially exploit any vulnerabilities that are present on the web server(s). 
System Configurations 
System configurations could be analyzed to determine the network structure of the organization and how it is 
configured. This data could be helpful for further network attacks that could be used to obtain more information 
than the information that is present on the laptop’s internal storage device. 
If the system is configured to access the internet through a proxy server, these credentials and connection 
information can be used to determine where the proxy server is on the network, and how to connect to it, which 
could be used by an attacker to redirect traffic to a different location. If an automatic configuration script is 
available on the system, it can contain this information (Microsoft, 2017d). 
Wireless network credentials can also be stored on a laptop, and these can be retrieved from the laptop’s internal 
storage device (Microsoft, 2017c). These credentials can be used to easily gain access to any wireless networks 
that the laptop has been connected to, including home networks and networks at organizations. 
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Laptops that have been connected to an organization may have network drives configured in the operating 
system (Microsoft, 2017b). The configuration information for these network drives can be used to determine the 
network and storage structure of the organization, as the network paths show up in the file browser. Also, some 
of these network drives may have been configured to store some information and data offline, and this 
information and data will be stored on the laptop’s internal storage device. 
STATISTICS OF STOLEN OR OTHERWISE MISPLACED LAPTOPS IN 2015 
Table 1:  of all cases in 2015 




Was the device 
password protected? 





100,000 Password protected Unencrypted (Greenberg, 2015c) 
Healthcare 39,090   (Snell, 2015a) 
Education 9,300 Password protected Not encrypted (Leventhal, 2015) 
Healthcare 8,000   (Muckenfuss, 2015) 
Healthcare 3,000  Not encrypted (Lewis, 2015) 
Healthcare 2,800  Encrypted (WISN, 2015) 
Healthcare 1,359 Password protected Not encrypted (Cantu, 2015) 
Education 941 Password protected Not encrypted (Gallagher, 2015) 
Financial  Password protected Not encrypted (Ilascu, 2015) 
Healthcare    (Snell, 2015b) 
Healthcare   “All of the personal 
information 
contained on the 
laptop was deleted” 
(Greenberg, 2015d) 
Law    (Greenberg, 2015b) 
Military   Encrypted (Shropshire-Star, 
2015) 
Security   Encrypted (Greenberg, 2015a) 
Table 2: Data analysis of cases in 2015 
Industry Sector Total number of 
breaches 
Average number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Total number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Background Screening 1 100,000 100,000 
Healthcare 7 7,750 54,249 
Education 2 5,121 10,241 
Financial 1 0 0 
Law 1 0 0 
Military 1 0 0 
Security 1 0 0 
Total 14 16,124 164,490 
 
As some of the articles or sources did not specify the number of potentially affected people, the calculations of 
total numbers in this table assumes that 0 people were affected on the cases with no data on the number of 
affected people for calculating the averages. 
STATISTICS OF STOLEN OR OTHERWISE MISPLACED LAPTOPS IN 2016 
Table 3: Total of all cases in 2016 
Industry Number of 
potentially 
affected people 
Was the device 
password protected? 
Was the device 
encrypted? 
 
Healthcare 5,000,000   (Barth, 2016) 
Government >1,000,000^   (Press Herald, 2016) 
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Military 130,000   (Bevan, 2016) 





 (Belliveau, 2016b) 
Healthcare <25,000# Password protected  (Devlin, 2016) 
Healthcare 12,000 Password protected  (Martin, 2016) 
Education 4,022   (Monegain, 2016) 
Healthcare 3,119   (Snell, 2016) 
Sport >1,000*   (Clarke, 2016) 
Healthcare 600  “Patient information 
on the hard drive was 
encrypted” 
(Belliveau, 2016a) 




Education  Password protected.  (Whitbourn, 2016) 
     
Healthcare  Password protected Not encrypted (Masters, 2016b) 
Healthcare   Unencrypted (Olenick, 2016b) 
Prison  Password protected Not encrypted (Jayanthi, 2016) 
Security  Password protected  (Olenick, 2016a) 
     
Vacation 
Properties 
   (Masters, 2016a) 
* Article only specified “thousands of players”. 
^ Article only specified “millions”. 
# Article only specified “up to 25,000”. 
Table 4: Data analysis of cases in 2016 
Industry Sector Total number of 
breaches 
Average number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Total number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Healthcare 9 588,727 5,298,543 
Government 2 500,432 1,000,865 
Military 1 130,000 130,000 
Education 2 2,011 4,022 
Sport 1 1,000 1,000 
Aged care 1 75 75 
Prison 1   
Security 1   
Vacation Properties 1   
Total 19 135,805 6,434,505 
 
As some of the articles or sources did not specify the number of potentially affected people, the calculations of 
total numbers in this table assumes that 0 people were affected on the cases with no data on the number of 
affected people for calculating the averages. 
DATA ANALYSIS OF ALL STOLEN OR OTHERWISE MISPLACED LAPTOPS IN 
2015 AND 2016 
Table 5 
Industry Sector Total number of 
breaches 
Average number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Total number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Healthcare 16 334,350 5,352,792 
Government 2 500,432 1,000,865 
Military 2 65,000 130,000 
Background Screening 1 100,000 100,000 
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Education 4 3,566 14,263 
Sport 1 1,000 1,000 
Aged care 1 75 75 
Security 2 0 0 
Financial 1 0 0 
Law 1 0 0 
Prison 1 0 0 
Vacation Properties 1 0 0 
Total 33 83,702 6,598,995 
 
As some of the articles or sources did not specify the number of potentially affected people, the calculations of 
total numbers in this table assumes that 0 people were affected on the cases with no data on the number of 
affected people for calculating the averages. 
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS 
An analysis of 33 different cases of laptops being stolen or otherwise misplaced found that a total of 16 of these 
were from the healthcare industry. The largest total number of potentially affected people with 5,000,000 
potentially affected people in one data breach was from the healthcare industry. In these cases, the system was 
either protected with just a password or no security information was available. No encryption was used on the 
majority of the laptops in the cases. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of devices stolen from each sector. As shown in the diagram, 49% of cases 
occurred in the healthcare industry. The second largest industry was the education industry, with 12% of the 
cases. 
 
Figure 1: Number of cases 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of people potentially affected in total by each industry sector. Healthcare had a 
total of 81% of the total number of potentially affected people, with the government sector following at 15% of 
the total number of potentially affected people. 
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 Figure 2: Number of potentially affected people 
An analysis of available security information finds that there was no encryption used on the majority of laptops, 
and that they were simply protected with passwords in their operating systems. This means that all the 
information discussed in previous sections of this paper would be accessible in plain text, and an attacker can 
simply connect the storage device to another system or boot a live operating system on the stolen or misplaced 
laptop to gain access to the information on the system, allowing them to breach the integrity of the data of the 
potential number of affected people for each stolen or misplaced system. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this paper finds that very little security is used on laptops that contain personal information of 
employees or customers of businesses or other organisations. In some cases, the laptops belonged to the 
employees, rather than belonging to an organisation. 
In total, the statistics of this paper finds that across the total of 33 analysed cases, an average of 83,702 people 
were potentially affected per stolen or otherwise misplaced laptop, with the total number of people potentially 
affected by stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops was 6,598,995 people. 
The information in this paper can be used as a reference point for determining the security protocols that should 
be used on mobile devices, including but not limited to, laptops, phones, tablets and more. This paper’s 
information is an example of the potential losses and breaches of integrity from a single stolen or otherwise 
misplaced unencrypted device from either an organisation or an employee’s personal possessions. 
Further research should be conducted yearly to monitor the statistics of stolen laptops, to check if data breaches 
from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops continues to increase over time. If the statistics and information in 
this paper are used effectively in education and training, further research in this area should show a decline in the 
number of data breaches and potentially affected users from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in the future. 
Further research over the past ten years should also be conducted to provide an accurate representation of the 
changes to the number of data breaches and people affected by stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in the past, 
compared to the amount in 2015-2016 and the future. The data collected by all the research can be graphed and 
tabled for statistical and educational purposes with the intent to reduce the number of data breaches that occur 
from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in the future. 
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